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Abstract
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for col-
laboration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between
many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents. In
this paper we introduce the first extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and ex-
plore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We adapt
several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking systems to the
context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of systems that
satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms are necessary for
this result.
1 Introduction
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collaboration in
a multi-agent environment. In these systems, agents report on their peers’ performance,
and these reports are aggregated to form a ranking of the agents. This ranking may
be either global, where all agents see the same ranking, or personalized, where each
agent is provided with her own ranking of the agents. Examples of global ranking
systems include eBay’s reputation system[20] and Google’s PageRank[18]. Examples
of personalized ranking systems include the personalized version of PageRank[14] and
the MoleTrust ranking system[8]. Furthermore, trust systems which provide each agent
with a set of agents he or she can trust, can be viewed as personalized ranking systems
which supply a two-level ranking over the agents. Many of these systems can be easily
adapted to provide a full ranking of the agents. Examples of trust systems include
OpenPGP(Pretty Good Privacy)’s trust system[10], the ranking system employed by
Advogato[16], and the epinions.com web of trust.
∗This paper is an extended version of [3].
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A central challenge in the study of ranking systems, is to provide means and rig-
orous tools for the evaluation of these systems. This challenge equally applies to both
global and personalized ranking systems. A central approach to the evaluation of such
systems is the experimental approach. In the general ranking systems setting, this ap-
proach was successfully applied to Hubs&Authorities[15] and to various other ranking
systems[9]. In the trust systems setting, [17] suggests a similar experimental approach.
A more analytical approach to the evaluation of ranking systems is the axiomatic
approach. In this approach, one considers basic properties, or axioms, one might re-
quire a ranking system to satisfy. Then, existing and new systems are classified ac-
cording to the set of axioms they satisfy. Examples of such study in the global ranking
systems literature include [11, 9, 22, 5, 19]. Typical results of such study are axioma-
tizations of particular ranking systems, or a proof that no ranking system satisfying a
set of axioms exists. For example, in [2] we provide a set of axioms that are satisfied
by the PageRank system and show that any global ranking system that satisfies these
axioms must coincide with PageRank.
While the axiomatic approach has been extensively applied to the global ranking
systems setting, no general attempt has been made to apply such an approach to the
context of personalized ranking systems. In this paper, we introduce an extensive ax-
iomatic study of the personalized ranking system setting, by adapting axioms that have
been previously applied to global ranking systems[1, 4]. We compare several existing
personalized ranking systems in the light of these axioms, and provide novel ranking
systems that satisfy various sets of axioms. Moreover, we prove a full characterization
of the personalized ranking systems satisfying all suggested axioms.
We consider four basic axioms. The first axiom, self confidence, requires that an
agent would be ranked at the top of his own personalized rank. The second axiom,
transitivity, captures the idea that an agent preferred by more highly trusted agents,
should be ranked higher than an agent preferred by less trusted agents. The third axiom,
Ranked Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, requires that under the perspective of
any agent, the relative ranking of two other agents would depend only on the pairwise
comparisons between the rank of the agents that prefer them. The last axiom, strong
incentive compatibility, captures the idea that an agent cannot gain trust by any agent’s
perspective by manipulating its reported trust preference.
We fully characterize the set of ranking systems satisfying all four axioms, and
show ranking systems satisfying every three of the four axioms (but not the fourth).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting of personalized
ranking systems and discusses some known system. In section 3 we present our axioms,
and classify the ranking systems shown according to these axioms. In section 4 we
provide a full characterization of the ranking systems satisfying all of our axioms, and
in section 5 we study ranking systems satisfying every three of the four axioms. Section
6 presents some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.
2
2 Personalized Ranking Systems
2.1 The Setting
Before describing our results regarding personalized ranking systems, we must first
formally define what we mean by the words “personalized ranking system” in terms of
graphs and linear orderings:
Definition 2.1. Let A be some set. A relation R ⊆ A × A is called an ordering on A
if it is reflexive, transitive, and complete. Let L(A) denote the set of orderings on A.
Notation 2.2. Let be an ordering, then ≃ is the equality predicate of , and ≺ is the
strict order induced by . Formally, a ≃ b if and only if a  b and b  a; and a ≺ b if
and only if a  b but not b  a.
Given the above we can define what a personalized ranking system is:
Definition 2.3. Let GV be the set of all directed graphs G = (V,E) with no parallel
edges, but possibly with self-loops1. A personalized ranking system(PRS) F is a func-
tional that for every finite vertex set V and for every source s ∈ V maps every graph
G ∈ GV to an orderingFG,s∈ L(V ).
Note that our definition of a personalized ranking system considers only the ordinal
ranking of the vertices and does not assign cardinal values to vertices. Also note that
our definition does not assume the existence of a path from s to every vertex. However,
in some settings this may be considered a useful assumption. Therefore, we shall use
these kind of graphs in all examples and counter-examples, but prove our results for
the more general case defined above.
2.2 Some personalized ranking systems
We shall now give examples of some known PRSs. A basic ranking system that is at
the basis of many trust systems ranks the agents based on the minimal distance of the
agents from the source.
Notation 2.4. LetG = (V,E) be some directed graph and v1, v2 ∈ V be some vertices,
we will use dG(v1, v2) to denote the length of the shortest directed path in G between
v1 and v2. If no such path exists, dG(v1, v2) , ∞.
Definition 2.5. The distance PRS FD is defined as follows: Given a graphG = (V,E)
and a source s, v1 FDG,s v2 ⇔ dG(s, v1) ≥ dG(s, v2)
Another family of PRSs can be derived from the well-known PageRank ranking
system by modifying the so-called teleportation vector in the definition of PageRank[14].
These systems can be defined as follows:
Definition 2.6. LetG = (V,E) be a directed graph, and assume V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}.
The PageRank Matrix AG (of dimension n× n) is defined as:
[AG]i,j =
{
1/|SG(vj)| (vj , vi) ∈ E
0 Otherwise.
1Unless otherwise noted, all our results still apply when self loops are not allowed.
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The Personalized PageRank procedure ranks pages according to the stationary prob-
ability distribution obtained in the limit of a random walk with a random teleportation
to the source s with probability d; this is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.7. Let G = (V,E) be some graph, and assume V = {s, v2, . . . , vn}.
Let r be the unique solution of the system (1 − d) · AG · r + d · (1, 0, . . . , 0)T = r.
The Personalized PageRank with damping factor d of a vertex vi ∈ V is defined as
PPRdG,s(vi) = ri. The Personalized PageRank Ranking System with damping factor
d is a PRS that for the vertex set V and source s ∈ V maps G to PPRdG,s , where
PPRdG,s is defined as: for all vi, vj ∈ V : vi 
PPRd
G,s vj if and only if PPRdG,s(vi) ≤
PPRdG,s(vj).
We now suggest a variant of the Personalized PageRank system, which, as we will
later show, has more positive properties than Personalized PageRank.
Definition 2.8. Let G = (V,E) be some graph and assume V = {s, v2, . . . , vn}. Let
BG be the link matrix for G. That is, [BG]i,j = 1 ⇔ (j, i) ∈ E. Let α = 1/n2 and
let a be the unique solution of the system α · BG · a + (1, αn, . . . , αn)T = a. The
α-Rank of a vertex vi ∈ V is defined as rG,s(vi) = ai. The α-Rank PRS is a PRS that
for the vertex set V and source s ∈ V maps G to αRG,s, where αRG,s is defined as: for
all vi, vj ∈ V : vi αRG,s vj if and only if rG,s(vi) ≤ rG,s(vj).
The α-Rank system ranks the agents based on their distance from s, breaking ties
by the summing of the trust values of the predecessors. By selecting α = 1/n2, it is
ensured that a slight difference in rank of nodes closer to s will be more significant
than a major difference in rank of nodes further from s.
Additional personalized ranking systems are presented in Section 5 as part of our
axiomatic study.
3 Some Axioms
A basic requirement of a PRS is that the source – the agent under whose perspective
we define the ranking system – must be ranked strictly at the top of the trust ranking,
as each agent implicitly trusts herself. We refer to this property as self confidence.
Definition 3.1. Let F be a PRS. We say that F satisfies self confidence if for all graphs
G = (V,E), for all sources s ∈ V and for all vertices v ∈ V \ {s}: v ≺FG,s s.
A basic property of (global) ranking systems called strong transitivity[1, 22], which
requires that if an agent a’s voters are ranked higher than those of agent b, then agent a
should be ranked higher than agent b. We adapt this notion to the personalized setting,
and provide a new weaker notion of transitivity as follows:
Notation 3.2. We will usePG(v) and SG(v) to denote the predecessor set and successor
set of v in G respectively. The subscript G may be omitted when understood from
context.
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Definition 3.3. Let F be a PRS. We say that F satisfies quasi transitivity if for all
graphs G = (V,E), for all sources s ∈ V and for all vertices v1, v2 ∈ V \ {s}:
Assume there is a 1-1 mapping f : P (v1) 7→ P (v2) s.t. for all v ∈ P (v1):v  f(v).
Then, v1  v2. F further satisfies strong quasi transitivity if when P (v1) 6= ∅ and for
all v ∈ P (v1): v ≺ f(v), then v1 ≺ v2. F further satisfies strong transitivity if when
either f is not onto or for some v ∈ P (v1): v ≺ f(v), then v1 ≺ v2.
The new notion of strong quasi transitivity requires that agents with stronger match-
ing predecessors be ranked at least as strong as agents with weaker predecessors, but
requires a strict preference only when all matching predecessors are strictly stronger.
A standard assumption in social choice settings is that an agent’s relative rank
should only depend on (some property of) their immediate predecessors. Such axioms
are usually called independence of irrelevant alternatives(IIA) axioms. In the global
ranking systems setting[1], we required that the relative ranking of two agents must
only depend on the pairwise comparisons of the ranks of their predecessors, and not on
their identity or cardinal value. The ranked IIA axiom differs from the one suggested
by [7] in the fact that ranked IIA does not consider the identity of the voters, but rather
their relative rank. We now adapt this axiom of ranked IIA to the setting of PRSs, by
requiring this independence for all vertices except the source.
To formally define this condition, one must consider all possibilities of comparing
two nodes in a graph based only on ordinal comparisons of their predecessors. These
possibilities are called comparison profiles:
Definition 3.4. A comparison profile is a 〈a,b〉where a = (a1, . . . , an), b = (b1, . . . , bm),
a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm ∈ N, a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an, and b1 ≤ b2 ≤ · · · ≤ bm. Let P be
the set of all such profiles.
A PRS F , a graph G = (V,E), a source s ∈ V , and a pair of vertices v1, v2 ∈ V
are said to satisfy such a comparison profile 〈a,b〉 if there exist 1-1 mappings f1 :
P (v1) 7→ {1 . . . n} and f2 : P (v2) 7→ {1 . . .m} such that given f : ({1} × P (v1)) ∪
({2} × P (v2)) 7→ N defined as:
f(1, v) = af1(v)
f(2, u) = bf2(u),
f(i, x) ≤ f(j, y) ⇔ x FG,s y for all (i, x), (j, y) ∈ ({1} × P (v1)) ∪ ({2} × P (v2)).
We now require that for every such profile the personalized ranking system ranks
the nodes consistently:
Notation 3.5. We will use V Gs to denote the set of vertices that have a directed path
from s in a graph G. We will sloppily use Vs when G is understood from context.
Definition 3.6. Let F be a PRS. We say that F satisfies ranked independence of ir-
relevant alternatives (RIIA) if there exists a mapping f : P 7→ {0, 1} such that for
every graph G = (V,E), for every source s ∈ V and for every pair of vertices
v1, v2 ∈ V Gs \ {s} and for every comparison profile p ∈ P that v1 and v2 sat-
isfy, v1 FG,s v2 ⇔ f(p) = 1. We will sloppily use the notation a 4 b to denote
f〈a,b〉 = 1.
This IIA axiom intuitively means that the relative ranking of agents must be con-
sistent across all comparisons with the same rank relations.
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3.1 Incentive Compatibility
The issue of incentives has been extensively studied both in classical social choice[13,
21, 12], and with regard to global ranking systems[4, 5]. As with global ranking sys-
tems, agents ranked by personalized ranking systems may wish to manipulate their
reported preferences in order to improve their trustworthiness in the eyes of a specific
agent. Therefore, the incentives of these agents should in many cases be taken into
consideration.
We would like our ranking systems to stand against various types of manipulations.
It is important to formally define what a manipuation is, and the types of manipulations
we would like to defend against.
Definition 3.7. A manipulation is a function M that maps every graph G = (V,E) ∈
G and every vertex v ∈ V in that graph to a set of graphs M ⊆ G such that G ∈ M
and v ∈ G′ for all G′ ∈M .
That is, a manipulation defines for every vertex in any graph, what different graphs
can that agent cause to be presented to the ranking system as a result of a manipulation.
Our standard of incentive compatibility is strong incentive compatibility, which
requires that agents will not improve their rank in the terms of the number of agents
ranked above them and the number or agents ranked the same as them2:
Definition 3.8. Let F be a PRS. F satisfies strong incentive compatibility under ma-
nipulation M if for all true preference graphs G = (V,E), for all sources s ∈ V ,
for all vertices v ∈ V , and for all manipulations G′ ∈ M(G, v): |{x ∈ V ′|v ≺FG′
x}| ≥ |{x ∈ V |v ≺FG x}|; and if |{x ∈ V ′|v ≺FG′ x}| = |{x ∈ V |v ≺FG x}| then
|{x ∈ V ′|v ≃FG′ x}| ≥ |{x ∈ V |v ≃
F
G x}|.
In [4] and [5], we considered manipulation by modification of an agent’s outgoing
links. Such outgoing link manipulation can be defined as:
Mout(V,E, v) = {(V,E
′)|∀u ∈ V \ {v} : ∀u′ ∈ V : (u, u′) ∈ E ⇔ (u, u′) ∈ E′}.
The outgoing link manipulationMout is actually a special kind of manipulation in the
sense that the agent can perform the manipulation in both directions.
Definition 3.9. A manipulation M is called reversible if for all G = (V,E) ∈ G, for
all v ∈ V , and for all G′ ∈ M(G, v): G ∈ M(G′, v).
Reversible manipulations are important due to the following simple fact:
Fact 3.10. Let M be a reversible manipulation and let F be a PRS . F satisfies strong
incentive compatibility under M if and only if for all graphs G = (V,E), for all
sources s ∈ V , for all vertices v ∈ V , and for all manipulationsG′ ∈ M(G, v): |{x ∈
V ′|v ≺FG′ x}| = |{x ∈ V |v ≺
F
G x}| and |{x ∈ V ′|v ≃FG′ x}| = |{x ∈ V |v ≃FG x}|.
2In [4], we have defined the notion of a utility function un : N 7→ R that for every graph size n maps
the number of agents ranked below a specific agent in a strict ranking to a utility value, and we assumed
such utility functions are nondecreasing. If we further assume that un(i) = um(i + n − m) for all
0 < i < m < n, that is, an agent’s utility in a strict ranking depends only on the number of agents ranked
above it, we can show that our current defintion of stong incentive compatibility is equivalent to the one in
[4].
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Therefore, in a PRS that is incentive compatible under a reversible manipulation an
agent cannot change its rank at all by performing a manipulation.
Another type of manipulation, considered by [11] is concerned with the generation
of fraudulent identities in order to manipulate one’s rank. Their setting considered
weighted edges, as opposed to our setting where the edges are binary. However, we
can adapt their sybil form of manipulation by simply removing these weghts.
A sybil manipulation, or sybling strategy is a manipulation in which an agent con-
trolling one vertex v in the graph can create any number of fraudulent identities (or
sybils) and freely manipulate the links among these sybils, while maintaining the same
set of incoming and outgoing links (possibly duplicated) among the sybil group as a
whole.
Thus, we can define the sybil manipulation as:
Msybil(V,E, v) = {(V
′, E′)|
V ⊆ V ′ ∧ ∀u, u′ ∈ V \ {v} : (u, u′) ∈ E ⇔ (u, u′) ∈ E′ ∧
PG(v) \ {v} = (V \ {v}) ∩
⋃
u∈V ′\V ∪{v}
PG′(u) ∧
SG(v) \ {v} = (V \ {v}) ∩
⋃
u∈V ′\V ∪{v}
SG′(u)}.
We can also consider the combined manipulation of the two, which is not the same
as the simple union of these manipulations:
Mboth(V,E, v) = {(V
′, E′)|
V ⊆ V ′ ∧ ∀u, u′ ∈ V \ {v} : (u, u′) ∈ E ⇔ (u, u′) ∈ E′ ∧
PG(v) \ {v} = (V \ {v}) ∩
⋃
u∈V ′\V ∪{v}
PG′(u).
It turns out that strong incentive compatibility under both outgoing edge and sybling
manipulations is equivalent to strong incentive compatibility under the combined ma-
nipulation:
Fact 3.11. Let F be a PRS. F satisfies strong incentive compatibility underMout and
underMsybil if and only if it satisfies strong incentive compatibility underMboth.
Proof. The “if” direction is trivial. For the “only if” direction, let G = (V,E) be
a graph and v ∈ V . Consider a manipulation (V ′, E′) ∈ Mboth(V,E, v). Let
U = {x|∃u ∈ V ′\V ∪{v} : (u, x) ∈ E′}. LetE′′ = E\{(v, x)|x ∈ V }∪{(v, x)|x ∈
U}. Now (V,E′′) ∈ Mout(V,E, v) and (V ′, E′) ∈ Msybil(V,E′′, v), and due to
strong incentive compatibility under these manipulations, F also satisfies strong incen-
tive compatibility under manipulation (V ′, E′) and indeed under any manipulation in
Mboth.
3.2 Satisfication
We will now demonstrate the aforementioned axioms by showing which axioms are
satisfied by the PRSs mentioned in Section 2.2.
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Proposition 3.12. The distance PRS FD satisfies self confidence, ranked IIA, tran-
sitivity, and strong incentive compatibility under Mboth, but does not satisfy strong
transitivity.
Proof. Self-confidence is satisfied by definition of FD. FD satisfies RIIA, because it
ranks every comparison profile in the connected section consistently according to the
following rule:
(a1, a2, . . . , an) 4 (b1, b2, . . . , bm) ⇔ an ≤ bm.
That is, any two vertices are compared according to their strongest predecessor. FD
satisfies strong quasi transitivity, because the ranking of the profiles above is consistent
with strong quasi transitivity. The unconnected vertices are all equal to each other and
weaker than the connected vertices which is also true for their predecessors, and thus
strong quasi transitivity is satisfied.
To prove that FD satisfies strong incentive compatibility, note the fact that an agent
x cannot modify the shortest path from s to x by changing its outgoing links or adding
sybils since any such shortest path necessarily does not include x or its sybils (except
as target). Moreover, x or its sybils cannot change the shortest path to any agent y with
d(s, y) ≤ d(s, x), because x and its sybils are necessarily not on the shortest path from
s to y. Therefore, the amount of agents ranked above x and its sybils and the amount
of agents ranked equal to x or its sybils cannot decrease due to x’s manipulations.
To prove FD does not satisfy strong transitivity, consider the graph in Figure 1a. In
this graph, x and y are ranked the same, even though P (x) ( P (y), in contradiction to
strong transitivity.
Proposition 3.13. The Personalized PageRank ranking systems satisfy self confidence
if and only if the damping factor is set to more than 12 3. Moreover, Personalized PageR-
ank does not satisfy weak transitivity, ranked IIA or strong incentive compatibility un-
der Mout or Msybil for any damping factor.
Proof. To prove the that PPR does not satisfy self-confidence for d ≤ 12 , consider the
graph in Figure 1b. For any damping factor d, the PPR will be PPR(s) = d and
PPR(x) = 1 − d. If d ≤ 12 then PPR(s) ≤ PPR(x) and thus s 
PPRd x, in
contradiction to the self confidence axiom.
PPR satisfies self-confidence for d > 12 because then PPR(s) ≥ d >
1
2 , while for
all v ∈ V \ {s}, PPR(v) ≤ 1− d < 12 .
To prove that PPR does not satisfy strong quasi transitivity and ranked IIA, consider
the graph in Figure 1c. The PPR of this graph for any damping factor d is as follows:
PPR(s) = d; PPR(a) = d(1−d)2 ; PPR(b) =
d(1−d)2
4 ; PPR(c) =
d(1−d)2
2 .
Therefore, the ranking of this graph is: b ≺ c ≺ a ≺ s. Quasi transitivity is violated
because b ≺ c even though P (b) = P (c) = a. This also violates ranked IIA because
the ranking profile 〈(1), (1)〉 must be ranked as equal due to trivial comparisons such
as a and a.
3If we do not allow self-loops this bound becomes (
√
5− 1)/2 ≈ 0.618.
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Figure 1: Graphs proving PRS do not satisfy axioms.
9
Strong incentive compatibility underMout is not satisfied, because in the graph in
Figure 1c, if any of the b agents b′ would have voted for themselves, they would have
been ranked b ≺ b′ ≺ c ≺ a ≺ s, which is a strict increase in b′ rank.
To show that strong incentive compatibility under Msybil is not satisfied, consider
the graph in Figure 1d. Note that a ≃ b ≺ s in this graph. Consider the manipulation
by a where a sybil a′ is added along with the edges {(s, a′), (a′, a)}. In this case,
the PageRank value of b would be 13 (1 − d)d while the PageRank value of a will be
(1−d)+1
3 (1 − d)d. Therefore, b ≺ a ≺ s in the manipulated graph, and thus strong
incentive compatibility is not satisfied.
It is interesting to note that although Personalized Pagerank does not satisfy strong
incentive compatibility underMsybil, a weighted version of Personalized PageRank is
in fact sybilproof with regard to the weighted definition of sybilproofness presented in
[11].
Strong transitivity is also satisfied by a natural PRS — the α-Rank system:
Proposition 3.14. The α-Rank system satisfies self confidence and strong transitiv-
ity, but does not satisfy ranked IIA or strong incentive compatibility under Mout or
Msybil.
Proof. To show α-Rank satisfies self confidence, note that by definition rG,s(s) ≥ 1.
Assume for contradiction that maxv 6=s rG,s(v) ≥ 1. Then,
rG,i(s) ≤ 1 + α
∑
v∈V
rG,s(v)
≤ 1 + α
[
(n− 1)max
v 6=s
rG,s(v) + rG,i(s)
]
rG,i(s) ≤
1
1− α
+
α
1− α
(n− 1)max
v 6=s
rG,s(v) ≤
≤ 2 + max
v 6=s
rG,s(v)
max
v 6=s
rG,s(v) ≤ α
n + α
∑
v∈V
rG,s(v)
≤ αn + α
[
n ·max
v 6=s
rG,s(v) + 2
]
[
1−
n
n2
]
max
v 6=s
rG,s(v) ≤
2
n2
+
1
n2n
n2 − n ≤ 2 + 1/n2n−2
n2 − n− 1/n2n−2 ≤ 2
2 ≤ n(n− 1) < 2
To prove α-Rank satisfies strong transitivity, consider two vertices a, b ∈ V \ {s}
and a function f : P (a) 7→ P (b) such that v  f(v) for all v ∈ P (a). Then,
rG,s(a)/α− α
n =
∑
v∈P (a)
rG,s(v) ≤
∑
v∈f(P (a))
rG,s(v) ≤
10
≤
∑
v∈P (b)
rG,s(v) = rG,s(b)/α− α
n, (1)
which implies a  b. If for some v ∈ P (a): v ≺ f(v) , or if f is not onto, then the
first or the second inequality respectively in (1) above is strict, which implies a ≺ b, as
required.
To prove α-Rank does not satisfy strong incentive compatibility underMout, con-
sider the graph in Figure 1e. In this graph α-Rank ranks d ≺ b. However, if d removes
the link to b they will be ranked equally and thus reducing the number of agents stronger
than d. To prove α-Rank does not satisfy strong incentive compatibility underMsybil,
consider again the graph in Figure 1e. Agent c is ranked below agent b in this graph.
However, she can duplicate herself and add edges (c, c′) and (c′, c) to be ranked above
b thus decreasing the number of agents ranked better than herself.
To prove α-Rank does not satisfy RIIA, consider the graph in Figure 1f. It is easy
to calculate the following α-Rank values:
r(s) = 1
r(i) = r(h) = α + α10
r(d) = r(e) = α2 + α10 + α11
r(f) = 2α2 + α3 + α10 + 3α11 + α12
r(g) = α2 + α3 + α10 + 2α11 + α12
r(a) = 2α3 + α10 + 2α11 + 2α12
r(b) = 2α3 + α4 + α10 + α11 + 3α12 + α13
r(c) = α3 + α4 + α10 + α11 + 2α12 + α13.
Therefore, this graph is ranked c ≺ a ≺ b ≺ d ≃ e ≺ g ≺ f ≺ i ≃ h ≺ s. Note
that (a, b) and (a, c) both satisfy the profile 〈(1, 1), (2)〉, however a ≺ b and c ≺ a in
contradiction to RIIA.
4 A Characterization Theorem
Our main result is a full characterization of the PRSs that satisfy the axioms above. We
will see that these systems are the generalized strong count systems. Strong count rank
agents based on their strongest predecessors, breaking ties according to the number of
equal strongest predecessors the agents have. The function r below determines how
such ties are broken. As s is stronger than all other agents, the strongest predecessor of
each agent in Vs \ {s} must be closer to s.
The strong count system is formally defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. Let r : N 7→ N be a monotone nondecreasing function such that
r(i) ≤ i for all i ∈ N. The strong count system SCr is recursively defined as follows:
First of all, y ≃ y′ ≺ x ≺ s for all x ∈ Vs \ {s} and y, y′ ∈ V \ Vs. For x ∈ Vs \ {s},
denote P ′(x) = P (x) ∩ {y|d(s, y) < d(s, x)}, and Pmax(x) = {y|y ∈ P ′(x), ∀z ∈
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P ′(x) : z SCr y}. Now for a, b ∈ Vs \ {s}:
a SCr b ⇔ (∃x ∈ Pmax(a), y ∈ Pmax(b) : x ≺
SCr y) ∨
∨[ (∀x ∈ Pmax(a), y ∈ Pmax(b) : x ≃
SCr y) ∧
∧((r(|Pmax(a)|) ≤ r(|Pmax(b)|))].
The strong count systems rank based on the strongest predecessor’s rank and then
break ties based on the number of strongest predecessors. Unconnected vertices are
equally ranked at the bottom. Note that for r ≡ 1, the Strong Count PRS is exactly the
distance system.
Our main result claims that these strong count systems are the only systems that
satisfy all aforementioned axioms.
Theorem 4.2. Let F be a PRS. The following three statements are equivalent:
1. F is a strong count system for some r.
2. F satisfies self confidence, strong quasi transitivity, ranked IIA and strong incen-
tive compatibility underMout.
3. F satisfies self confidence, strong quasi transitivity, ranked IIA and strong incen-
tive compatibility underMboth.
We begin our proof by showing that the strong count systems do in fact satisfy all
these axioms.
Proof. (1 ⇒ 3): Let r be a monotone nondecreasing function such that r(x) ≤ x. SCr
satisfies self confidence by definition.
To show that SCr satisfies RIIA and strong quasi transitivity on elements of Vs,
we will show that it ranks any profile p = 〈(a1, . . . , an); (b1, . . . , bm)〉 as follows: Let
ca = max{i ∈ N|an−i = an−i+1 = · · · = an} and cb = max{i ∈ N|bm−i =
bm−i+1 = · · · = bm}.
f(p) = 1 ⇔ (an < bm) ∨
∨ [(an = bm) ∧ (r(ca) ≤ r(cb))]
This almost follows from the recursive definition of SCr, however it remains to show
that ∀x, y ∈ V : d(s, x) < d(s, y) ⇒ x ≺SC y. This can be proven by induction
on d(s, y). If y = s this is trivial by definition. Otherwise, by the assumption of
induction, ∃x′ ∈ Pmax(x), y′ ∈ Pmax(y) : x′ ≺SC y′ and thus by the recursive
definition, x ≺SC y.
Strong quasi transitivity involving elements in V \Vs and elements either in V \Vs
or in Vs \ {s} is satisfied because for all x ∈ V \ Vs and y ∈ V \ {s} we have x  y
(by definition) and if x ≺ y then y ∈ Vs \ {s} and thus there is some y′ ∈ P (y) such
that for all x′ ∈ P (x): x′  y′.
With regard to the strong incentive compatibility under Mboth, due to the dis-
tance feature proven above, all sybils of v will be strictly weaker than the vertices with
smaller distance from s. Furthermore, any other vertices that were stronger than v in
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the original graph will be stronger than any of v’s sybils, due to the fact that the relative
rank of two vertices is determined only based on incoming links from vertices closer
to s, and more incoming edges cannot decrease an agent’s rank. By the same logic,
vertices which were equal to v in the original graph, will either be stronger or equal to
v in the manipulated graph.
In order to prove the hard direction of Theorem 4.2 (2 ⇒ 1), we will first show that
a strong notion of transitivity is implied by the axioms:
Definition 4.3. Let F be a PRS. We say that F satisfies weak maximum transitivity
if for all graphs G = (V,E), for all sources s ∈ V and for all vertices v1, v2 ∈ Vs:
Let m1,m2 be the maximally ranked vertices in P (v1), P (v2) respectively. Assume
m1 ≺ m2. Then, v1 ≺ v2.
Lemma 4.4. Let F be a PRS that satisfies self confidence, strong quasi transitivity,
RIIA and strong incentive compatibility. Then, F satisfies weak maximum transitivity.
Proof. In order to show that F satisfies weak maximum transitivity, we will show
that for every comparison profile the ranking must be consistent with weak maxi-
mum transitivity. Let p = 〈(a1, a2, . . . , ak), (b1, b2, . . . , bl)〉 be a comparison pro-
file where ak 6= bl. Assume wlog that bl < ak and assume for contradiction that
〈(a1, a2, . . . , ak)  (b1, b2, . . . , bl)〉. Consider the graph G = (V,E) defined as fol-
lows:
V = {s, a, b} ∪ {uji |i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {0, . . . , ak}}
E = {(uji , u
j−1
i )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {1, . . . , ak}} ∪
∪{(s, ubli )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}} ∪
∪{(uji , a)|ai = j} ∪ {(u
j
i , b)|bi = j}.
Figure 2 contains such a graph for the profile 〈(1, 4), (2, 2, 3)〉.
Note that by strong quasi transitivity and self confidence, for all i, i′, j, j′: uji  u
j′
i′
iff , j ≤ j′. Therefore, we will use uj to denote any uji . By the construction of G, a
and b satisfy p. Thus, from our assumption, a  b.
By strong quasi transitivity, a  ubl , and thus from our assumption also b  ubl .
Now consider the point of view of agent ubll . She can perform a manipulation by not
voting for b. This manipulation must not change her relative rank, as it is in Mout. As
the relative ranks of the uji agents and s are unaffected by this manipulation, it cannot
affect the ranks of a and b relative to ubll , and thus after the edge (u
bl
l , b) is removed,
we still have b  ubll . We can repeat this process for all i = bl, . . . , 2, with the result
that in the graph G′ for the profile 〈(a1, a2, . . . , ak), (b1)〉, b  ub2  ub1 . However,
by strong quasi transitivity, b ≃G′ ub1−1 ≺G′ ub1 G′ b, which is a contradiction.
We can now prove the hard direction of Theorem 4.2.
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Figure 2: Example of graph from proof of Lemma 4.4.
Proof. (Theorem 4.2: 2 ⇒ 1) Given Lemma 4.4, it remains to look at profiles 〈(a1, a2, . . . , ak), (b1, b2, . . . , bl)〉
where ak = bl. Denote M = ak = bl. Let p be such a profile. Denote xa = |{n|an =
M}| and similarly xb = |{n|bn = M}|. These values denote the number of strongest
predecessors a and b have in profile p.
We will now prove by induction on k + l − xa − xb that F ranks p the same as
it ranks 〈(1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
xa times
), (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
xb times
)〉. If k + l − xa − xb = 0, then a1 = ak = b1 = bl,
and thus the requirement is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, we assume correctness for
k + l − xa − xb − 1. Further assume wlog that a1 6= ak. Denote r = ak−xa and
ya = |{n|an = r}|.
We shall now consider two cases:
• If b1 = bl or ak−xa 6= bl−xb . If b1 6= bl, then further assume wlog that ak−xa >
bl−xb . Consider the graph G = (V,E) defined as follows:
V = {s, a} ∪ {b1, . . . , bya} ∪
∪{uji |i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {0, . . . ,M}}
E = {(uji , u
j−1
i )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}} ∪
∪{(s, uMi )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}} ∪ {(u
j
i , a)|ai = j 6= r} ∪
∪{(uji , b
n)|bi = j, n = 1, . . . , ya} ∪ {(b
n, a)|n = 1, . . . , ya}.
Figure 3 contains such a graph for the profile 〈(1, 3, 3, 4), (1, 2, 4, 4)〉. Note that
by strong quasi transitivity and self confidence, for all i, i′, j, j′: uji  u
j′
i′ iff
, j ≤ j′. Therefore, we will use uj to denote any uji . Similarly, all bn are equal to
each other, and by weak maximum transitivity (Lemma 4.4), uM−1  a, b ≺ uM
(we will similarly use b to denote any bn). Therefore, a and b satisfy p. Now
consider the following manipulation by b1: Removing the outgoing edge to a.
This manipulation is in Mout and thus should not change the relative rank of b1.
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Figure 3: Example graph from the proof of Theorem 4.2 case 1.
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Note that b1’s predecessors remain the same and equal to the ones of b2, . . . , bya ,
and all bn remain equal. We must now show that for every allowable relative
ranking of uM−1, a, and b the manipulation cannot change a and b’s relative
rank. We will do this by considering all cases:
Ordering # Vertices equal to b # Vertices stronger than b
uM−1 ≃ b ≺ a ya + max(k, l) (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 2
uM−1 ≺ b ≺ a ya (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 2
uM−1 ≃ a ≃ b ya + max(k, l) + 1 (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 1
uM−1 ≺ a ≃ b ya + 1 (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 1
uM−1 ≃ a ≺ b ya (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 1
uM−1 ≺ a ≺ b ya (M − r) ·max(k, l) + 1
We see that any change in the relation between a and b will surely change b’s
rank in a way that is not strategyproof.
We have shown that profile p must be ranked the same as the profile
〈(a1, a2, . . . , ak−xa−1, ak−xa+1, . . . , ak), (b1, b2, . . . , bl)〉,
which by the assumption of induction gives us the desired result.
• Otherwise, ak−xa = bl−xb . Denote yb = |{n|bn = r}| and assume wlog that
yb ≥ ya. Consider the graph G = (V,E) defined as follows:
V = {s, a} ∪ {b0, . . . , byb} ∪
∪{uji |i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {0, . . . ,M}}
E = {(uji , u
j−1
i )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}; j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}} ∪
∪{(s, uMi )|i ∈ {1, . . . ,max(k, l)}} ∪ {(u
j
i , a)|ai = j 6= r} ∪
∪{(uji , b
n)|bi = j 6= r, n = 0, . . . , y} ∪
∪{(bn, a)|n = 1, . . . , ya} ∪ {(b
n, bm)|n 6= m ∈ {0, . . . , yb}}.
Figure 4 contains such a graph for the profile 〈(1, 1, 2, 2), (1, 1, 1, 2)〉. As before,
for all i, i′, j, j′: uji  u
j′
i′ iff , j ≤ j′ and we will use uj to denote any u
j
i . All
bn are equal to each other because if wlog b1 ≺ b2 then b1’s predecessors will
be stronger than b2’s predecessors and thus by strong quasi transitivity b2 
b1. Again, by weak maximum transitivity, uM−1  a, b ≺ uM and we will
use b to denote any bn. Therefore, a and b satisfy p. We can again consider
a manipulation by b1 removing an edge to a, again all bn remain equal and as
before the manipulation cannot change a and b’s relative rank, and when again
applying the assumption of induction we get the desired result.
By strong quasi transitivity, profiles where all predecessors are equal are ranked 〈1〉 
〈1, 1〉  · · ·. When considering the result above, we conclude any two vertices should
be weakly ranked according to the number of strongest predecessors they have, and by
RIIA the tie-breaking rule must be universal.
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Figure 4: Example graph from the proof of Theorem 4.2 case 2.
It remains to show that vertices in V \Vs will be ranked equally and strictly weaker
than those in Vs. Let m ∈ Vs be a minimally ranked vertex in Vs. Consider a manip-
ulation by m adding edges to all vertices in V \ Vs. By the above proof, all vertices
in V \ Vs will be equally ranked weaker than m. As m does not worsen its position
by performing this manipulation and the internal ranking in Vs does not change we
conclude that in any graph all vertices in V \ Vs must be ranked strictly weaker than
those in Vs.
We can show the vertices in V \ Vs are ranked equally by induction on the number
of edges between them. If there are no such edges, then by strong quasi transitivity, the
requirement is satisfied. Otherwise, consider an edge (v1, v2) such that v1, v2 ∈ V \Vs.
A manipulation by v1 adding this edge must retain its position and thus all agents in
V \ Vs must be ranked equally.
We have shown that all vertices must be ranked according to strong count and thus
the system must be a strong count system.
5 Relaxing the Axioms
We shall now prove the conditions in Lemma 4.4 (and thus also in Theorem 4.2(2)) are
all necessary by showing PRSs that satisfy each three of the four conditions, but do not
satisfy weak maximum transitivity. Some of these systems are quite artificial, while
others are interesting and useful.
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Proposition 5.1. There exists a PRS that satisfies strong quasi transitivity, RIIA and
strong incentive compatibility, but not self confidence nor weak maximum transitivity.
Proof. Let F−D be the PRS that ranks strictly the opposite of the depth system FD.
That is, v1 
F
−
D
G,s v2 ⇔ v2 
FD
G,s v1. The proof F
−
D satisfies strong quasi transitivity,
RIIA and strong incentive compatibility follows the proof of Proposition 3.12, with the
following rule for ranking comparison profiles:
(a1, a2, . . . , an) 4 (b1, b2, . . . , bm) ⇔ a1 ≤ b1.
F−D does not satisfy self confidence, because, by definition s is weaker than all other
agents, and does not satisfy weak maximum transitivity because in graph from Figure
1a, F−D ranks x and y equally even though the strongest predecessor of y, which is x,
is stronger than the strongest predecessor of x, which is s.
This PRS is highly unintuitive, as the most trusted agents are the ones furthest from
the source, which is by itself the least trusted.
Relaxing strong quasi transitivity leads to a PRS that is almost trivial:
Proposition 5.2. There exists a PRS that satisfies self confidence, ranked IIA and
strong incentive compatibility, but not strong quasi transitivity nor weak maximum
transitivity.
Proof. Let F be the PRS which ranks for every G = (V,E), for every source s ∈ V ,
and for every v1, v2 ∈ V \ {s}: v1 ≃ v2 ≺ s. That is, F ranks s on the top, and all of
the other agents equally. F trivially satisfies self confidence, RIIA and strong incentive
compatibility, as s is indeed stronger than all other agents and every comparison pro-
file is ranked equally. F does not satisfy strong quasi transitivity or weak maximum
transitivity, because in a chain of vertices starting from s all except s will be ranked
equally,
5.1 Relaxing Ranked IIA
When Ranked IIA is relaxed, we find a new ranking system that ranks according to the
distance from s, breaking ties according to the number of shortest paths from s.
Notation 5.3. LetG = (V,E) be some directed graph and v1, v2 ∈ V be some vertices,
we will use nG(v1, v2) to denote the number of directed paths of minimum length
between v1 and v2 in G. We will sloppily use the notations d(v) and n(v) to denote
dG(s, v)and nG(s, v) respectively.
Definition 5.4. The Path Count PRS FP is defined as follows: Given a graph G =
(V,E) and a source s, for all v1, v2 ∈ V \ {s}:
v1 
FP
G,s v2 ⇔ dG(s, v1) > dG(s, v2) ∨
(dG(s, v1) = dG(s, v2) ∧
∧nG(s, v1) ≤ nG(s, v2))
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Proposition 5.5. The path count PRS FP satisfies self confidence, strong quasi tran-
sitivity and strong incentive compatibility under Mboth , but not ranked IIA nor weak
maximum transitivity.
Proof. Self confidence is trivial as d(s) = 0 < d(v) for all v 6= s.
To prove FP satisfies quasi transitivity consider a graph G = (V,E), a source
s ∈ V and two vertices v1, v2 ∈ V \ {s}. Assume for contradiction that v2 ≺ v1 and
there exists a 1-1 function f : P (v1) 7→ P (v2) such that v  f(v) for all v ∈ P (v1).
By the definition of FP : d(v1) ≤ d(v2), but
d(v1) = min
v∈P (v1)
d(v) + 1 ≥ min
v∈f(P (v1))
d(v) + 1 ≥ min
v∈P (v2)
d(v) + 1 = d(v2),
and thus d(v1) = d(v2). Now,
n(v1) =
∑
v∈P (v1)∧d(v)+1=d(v1)
n(v) ≤
≤
∑
v∈f(P (v1))∧d(f−1(v))+1=d(v1)
n(v) ≤
≤
∑
v∈P (v2)∧d(v)+1=d(v2)
n(v) = n(v2).
Therefore, v1  v2 in contradiction to our assumption.
For strong quasi transitivity, assume now that v2  v1, P (v1) 6= ∅, and there exists
a 1-1 function f : P (v1) 7→ P (v2) such that v ≺ f(v) for all v ∈ P (v1). As above we
find that d(v1) = d(v2). Now,
n(v1) =
∑
v∈P (v1)∧d(v)+1=d(v1)
n(v) <
<
∑
v∈f(P (v1))∧d(f−1(v))+1=d(v1)
n(v) ≤ n(v2),
which yields v1 ≺ v2 in contradiction to our assumption.
To show FP satisfies strong incentive compatibility under Mboth, note that a ma-
nipulation by v cannot change d(v) or d(v′) ∀v′ : d(v′) < d(v). Moreover, v and
its sybils cannot gain any new edges from vertices closer to v or change their inter-
nal edges. For this reason, n(v) cannot increase and n(v′) cannot decrease for all v′
s.t. d(v′) ≤ d(v). Thus, FP does indeed satisfy strong incentive compatibility under
Mboth.
To show FP does not satisfy ranked IIA nor weak maximum transitivity, consider
the graph in Figure 5. FP ranks this graph as follows: a ≺ b ≺ y ≺ z ≺ x ≺ s.
Consider the profile 〈(2); (1, 1)〉. If we compare x and y we get (1, 1) ≺ (2), but if we
compare a and b we get (2) ≺ (1, 1), in violation of ranked IIA. Furthermore, the latter
comparison is in violation of weak maximum transitivity, as required.
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5.2 Relaxing incentive compatibility
When we relax incentive compatibility we find an interesting family of PRSs that rank
the agents according to their in-degree, breaking ties by comparing the ranks of the
strongest predecessors. These recursive in-degree systems work by assigning a rational
number trust value for every vertex, that is based on the following idea: rank first based
on the in-degree. If there is a tie, rank based on the strongest predecessor’s trust, and
so on. Loops are ranked as periodical rational numbers in base (n + 2) with a period
the length of the loop, only if continuing on the loop is the maximally ranked option.
The recursive in-degree systems differ in the way different in-degrees are com-
pared. Any monotone increasing mapping of the in-degrees could be used for the
initial ranking. To show these systems are well-defined and that the trust values can be
calculated we define these systems algorithmically as follows:
Definition 5.6. Let r : N 7→ N be a monotone nondecreasing function such that
r(i) ≤ i for all i ∈ N. The recursive in-degree PRS with rank function r is defined as
follows: Given a graph G = (V,E) and source s,
v1 
RIDr
G,s v2 ⇔ valuer,s(v1) ≤ valuer,s(v2),
where value is defined as:
valuer,s(v) = max
a∈Paths(v)
vpr,s(a) (2)
where the maximum is over the set of almost-simple paths to v not passing through s
(but which may start at s):
Paths(v) = { (v = a1, a2, . . . , am)|
(am, . . . , a1) is a path in G ∧ (am−1, . . . , a1) is simple ∧
∀i ∈ {1 . . .m− 1} : ai 6= s}.
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Figure 6: Values assigned by the recursive in-degree algorithm
and valuation function vp : V ∗ 7→ Q is defined as:
vpr,s(a1, a2, . . . , am) =
1
n+ 2


{
n+ 1 a1 = s
r(|P (a1)|) Otherwise
+

0 m = 1
vpr,s(a2, . . . , am, a2) a1 = am ∧m > 1
vpr,s(a2, . . . , am) Otherwise.


(3)
Note that vpr,s(a1, a2, . . . , am) is infinitely recursive in the case when a1 = am ∧
m > 1. For computation sake we can redefine this case finitely as:
vpr,s(a1, . . . , am, a1) =
∞∑
i=0
1
(n+ 2)mi
m∑
j=1
r(|P (aj)|)
(n + 2)j
=
=
(n+ 2)m
(n + 2)m − 1
vpr,s(a1, . . . , am).
Further note that when the r function is constant (r ≡ 1), then the recursive in-
degree system becomes the distance system on Vs, where the vertices in V \ Vs are
ranked weaker, and the ordering among them is set according to the length of the
longest path (simple or not) leading to the vertex.
An example of the values assigned for a particular graph when r is the identity
function is given in Figure 6. As n = 8, the trust values are decimal. Note that the loop
(b, d) generates a periodical decimal valuer,s(b) = vpr,s(b, d) = 0.32 by the infinite
recursion in (3).
These systems satisfy the axioms as required:
Proposition 5.7. Let r : N 7→ N be a monotone nondecreasing function such that
r(i) ≤ i for all i ∈ N and define r(0) = 0. The recursive in-degree ranking system with
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rank function r satisfies self-confidence, strong quasi-transitivity and RIIA. If r is not
constant4 then the recursive in-degree system further does not satisfy weak maximum
transitivity nor strong incentive compatibility under either Mout or Msybil.
Proof. We will prove that in the entire graph (not just Vs) every comparison profile
〈a,b〉 where a = (a1, . . . , ak), b = (b1, . . . , bl) is ranked as follows:
f〈a,b〉 = 1 ⇔ (k = 0) ∨ (r(k) < r(l)) ∨ [(r(k) = r(l)) ∧ (ak ≤ bl)] .
Note that this ranking of comparison profiles also implies strong quasi transitivity. To
show comparison profiles are ranked as such, we will prove that
valuer,s(v) =


0 v 6= s ∧ P (v) = ∅
n+1
n+2 v = s
1
n+2
[
r(|P (v)|) + maxp∈P (v) valuer,s(p)
]
Otherwise
(4)
and note that 0 ≤ valuer,s(v) ≤ n+1n+2 , and thus vertices other than s are ordered first by
r(|P (v)|) and then by maxp∈P (v) valuer,s(p), as required. Moreover, self confidence
is satisfied because for all v 6= s: valuer,s(v) < n+1n+2 .
The two edge cases are trivial, we shall now concentrate on the primary case in
(4). Let v ∈ V \ {s} be some vertex where P (v) 6= ∅. Denote Path′s(p, v) as the set
of almost-simple directed paths to p stopping at s which do not pass through v unless
immediately looping back to p:
Path′s(p, v) = { (p = a1, a2, . . . , am)|
(am, . . . , a1) is a path in G ∧ (am−1, . . . , a1) is simple ∧
∀i ∈ {1 . . .m− 1} : ai 6= s ∧
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2,m} : ai 6= v ∧ am−1 = v ⇔ am = p}.
Now we see that:
valuer,s(v) = max
a∈Paths(v)
vpr,s(a) =
=
1
n+ 2

 r(|P (v)|) + max(v=a1,...,am)∈Paths(v){ vpr,s(a2, . . . , am, a2) a1 = am ∧m > 1
vpr,s(a2, . . . , am) Otherwise.

 = (5)
=
1
n+ 2
[
r(|P (v)|) + max
p∈P (v)
max
a∈Path′
s
(p,v)
vpr,s(a)
]
= (6)
=
1
n+ 2
[
r(|P (v)|) + max
p∈P (v)
max
a∈Paths(p)
vpr,s(a)
]
=
=
1
n+ 2
[
r(|P (v)|) + max
p∈P (v)
valuer,s(p)
]
.
4If r is constant, the system still does not satisfy strong incentive compatibility under either Mout or
Msybil, but only if we allow vertices that have no path from s.
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Figure 8: Graph from proof that Recursive In-degree does not satisfy axioms
To show that the equality (6) holds, assume for contradiction that there exists p ∈ P (v)
and a ∈ Paths(p) such that
vpr,s(a) > max
p′∈P (v)
max
a
′∈Path′
s
(p′,v)
vpr,s(a′). (7)
From a ∈ Paths(p) \ Path′s(p, v), we know that ai = v for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Assume wlog that i is minimal. Let b denote the path (p = a1, a2, . . . , ai, p) and let
c denote the path (p′ = ai+1, . . . , am, aj+1, . . . , ai+1) if am = aj for some j < i or
(p′ = ai+1, . . . , am) otherwise. An example of such paths is given in Figure 7. Note
that b ∈ Path′s(p, v) and c ∈ Path′s(p′, v), where p, p′ ∈ P (v). Now, note that
vpr,s(a) =
(n+ 2)j − 1
(n + 2)j
vpr,s(b) +
1
(n + 2)j
vpr,s(c),
and thus vpr,s(a) must be between vpr,s(b) and vpr,s(c), in contradiction to assump-
tion (7).
We shall now prove that recursive in-degree is not incentive compatible under
Mout or Msybil and does not satisfy weak maximum transitivity. Let i ∈ N be the
minimum number such that r(i) > 1. Consider the graph G in Figure 8, where there
are i vertices labeled x. This graph is ranked x ≺ t ≺ s, where x refers to all ver-
tices labeled x. Weak maximum transitivity is not satisfied because x ≺ t even though
s ≻ x. Let x′ be one of the vertices labeled x. It can perform a manipulation in Mout
by removing its edge to t, and thus changing the ranking to x ≃ x′ ≃ t ≺ s. It can
also perform a manipulation in Msybil by creating i additional sybils of themselves
and create a complete clique thus changing the ranking to x ≺ v ≃ x′ ≃ t ≺ s, where
v are the new vertices involved from the manipulation.
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For an extensive study of the recursive in-degree system in the context of general
ranking systems see [6].
6 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a method for the evaluation of personalized ranking systems by
using axioms adapted from the ranking systems literature, and evaluated existing and
new personalized ranking systems according to these axioms. As most existing PRSs
do not satisfy these axioms, we have presented several new and practical personalized
ranking systems that satisfy subsets, or indeed all, of these axioms. We argue that these
new ranking systems have a more solid theoretical basis, and thus may very well be
successful in practice.
Furthermore, we have proven a representation theorem for the Strong Count rank-
ing systems, which are the only systems that satisfy all axioms.
This study is far from exhaustive. Further research is due in formulating new ax-
ioms, and proving representation theorems for the various PRSs suggested in this paper.
An additional avenue for research is modifying the setting in order to accommodate for
more elaborate input such as trust/distrust relations or numerical trust ratings, as seen
in some existing personalized ranking systems used in practice.
References
[1] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. On the axiomatic foundations of ranking systems. In
Proc. 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 917–922, 2005.
[2] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. Ranking systems: the pagerank axioms. In EC ’05:
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, pages 1–8, New York,
NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
[3] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. An axiomatic approach to personalized ranking
systems. In Proc. 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2006.
[4] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. Incentive compatible ranking systems, 2006. Tech-
nical report, Technion.
[5] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. Quantifying incentive compatibility of ranking sys-
tems. In Proc. of AAAI-06, 2006.
[6] Alon Altman and Moshe Tennenholtz. Axiomatic foundations for ranking systems. Tech-
nical Report, Technion, 2007.
[7] K.J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd Ed.). Yale University Press, 1963.
[8] Paolo Avesani, Paolo Massa, and Roberto Tiella. A trust-enhanced recommender system
application: Moleskiing. In SAC ’05: Proceedings of the 2005 ACM symposium on Applied
computing, pages 1589–1593, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
[9] Allan Borodin, Gareth O. Roberts, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal, and Panayiotis Tsaparas. Link
analysis ranking: algorithms, theory, and experiments. ACM Trans. Inter. Tech., 5(1):231–
297, 2005.
[10] J. Callas, L. Donnerhacke, H. Finney, and R. Thayer. RFC 2440: OpenPGP message
format, November 1998. Status: PROPOSED STANDARD.
24
[11] Alice Cheng and Eric Friedman. Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. In P2PECON ’05:
Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems,
pages 128–132, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM Press.
[12] Bhaskar Dutta, Matthew O Jackson, and Michel Le Breton. Strategic candidacy and voting
procedures. Econometrica, 69(4):1013–37, 2001.
[13] A. Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes. Econometrica, 41:587–601, 1973.
[14] T. Haveliwala, S. Kamvar, and G. Jeh. An analytical comparison of approaches to person-
alizing pagerank, 2003. Technical report, Stanford University.
[15] Jon M. Kleinberg. Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. Journal of the ACM
(JACM), 46(5):604–632, 1999.
[16] Raph Levien. Attack Resistant Trust Metrics. PhD thesis, University of California, Berke-
ley, 2002.
[17] Paolo Massa and Paolo Avesani. Controversial users demand local trust metrics: An ex-
perimental study on epinions.com community. In Proc. of AAAI-05, pages 121–126, 2005.
[18] L. Page, S. Brin, R. Motwani, and T. Winograd. The pagerank citation ranking: Bringing
order to the web. Technical Report, Stanford University, 1998.
[19] I. Palacios-Huerta and O. Volij. The measurement of intellectual influence. Econometrica,
73(3), 2004.
[20] P. Resnick and R. Zeckhauser. Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical
analysis of ebay’s reputation system. Working Paper for the NBER workshop on empirical
studies of electronic commerce, 2001.
[21] M.A. Satterthwaite. Stratey proofness and arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspon-
dence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic
Theory, 10:187–217, 1975.
[22] M. Tennenholtz. Reputation systems: An axiomatic approach. In Proceedings of the 20th
conference on uncertainity in Artificial Intelligence (UAI-04), 2004.
25
